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BEYOND EUREKA: WHAT CREATORS WANT
(FREEDOM, CREDIT, AND AUDIENCES) AND HOW
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CAN BETTER GIVE IT TO
THEM (BY SUPPORTING, SHARING, LICENSING,
AND ATTRIBUTION)
Colleen Chien*
The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators, and Everyday Intel-
lectual Property. By Jessica Silbey. California: Stanford Univer-
sity Press. 2015. Pp. xi, 285. Cloth, $85; paper, $25.95.
Introduction
I read Jessica Silbey’s book, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Inventors, and
Everyday Intellectual Property,1 while I was on sabbatical. The word sabbati-
cal, like the word Sabbath,2 conjures a sense of rest and a break from the
day-to-day rhythms of commerce, transactions, and, for me as a professor,
teaching. My husband was on sabbatical as well, and we and our two young
sons spent much of the summer in the house in Belgium where my husband
grew up, enjoying late sunsets, visiting with friends, and biking through
idyllic pasturelands. Summer is supposed to be a carefree time, and for me it
was—at times. But not until my sons were asleep or away at school or child
care programs did I have the time and space to rest, reflect, and refocus on
my writing projects, including this Review—to get the work done.
In the theater of the courtroom or the rough and tumble arena of intel-
lectual property policymaking, the day-to-day lives of creators are rarely
presented. We often instead see one-dimensional vignettes, for example, “the
new artist or band that has just released their [sic] first single and will not be
paid for its success,” described on Taylor Swift’s Tumblr last summer when
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law and former Obama
Administration Senior Advisor, Intellectual Property and Innovation, White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy. I thank Robert Merges, Paul Heald, Eric Goldman, Jeanne
Fromer, Petra Moser, Jorge Contreras, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, David Schwartz, Tyler
Ochoa, Brian Love, Pam Samuelson, and Jessica Silbey for helpful discussions, and the editors
of the Michigan Law Review, in particular Jenny Stone and Will Martin, for their patience and
helpful edits.
1. Jessica Silbey is a Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
2. Sabbatical, Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition
/american_english/sabbatical [https://perma.cc/WQ3Y-CLJJ] (the origin of the word “sabbati-
cal” is from the late sixteenth century, from Greek sabbatikos “of the sabbath”).
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she initially withdrew from Apple’s music streaming service.3 While instruc-
tive, this description leaves out that Swift and other artists have long relied
on “free play” mediums like radio and, more recently, YouTube to develop,
not cannibalize, their audiences and followers.4 Such accounts ignore both
context and the complex relationship between what creators want and need
and what intellectual property provides.
These are a few of the reasons that Jessica Silbey’s book, The Eureka
Myth, is both refreshing and important. In it, she draws from over fifty in-
terviews, completed over half a decade, with an array of creative profession-
als, including filmmakers, photographers, sculptors, journalists, novelists,
musicians, composers, hardware and software engineers, biologists, publish-
ers, computer scientists, and business executives.5 Silbey asked them about
their work, the challenges they faced, why and how they overcame profes-
sional obstacles, joys they experienced, and what was important to them.
And at the end of each interview, she asked them what they thought about
intellectual property (pp. 291–92). The resulting insights are as true as they
are original.
Take the experiences of Joan,6 an internationally known public artist
whose statements appear throughout the book. Joan is a woman who
“wanted to make paintings. I wanted to publish them. But I didn’t want to
own them. . . . It’s like having a litter of puppies and you [find] a good home
for each one of them” (p. 1; omission and alteration in original). Having to
maintain, store, and find “good homes” for artistic works is a practical bur-
den—one that, unless you are a visual artist, may not be the first thing that
comes to mind.7 Though placing puppies is a far cry from the fundamental
purposes of intellectual property—which according to the Supreme Court
include “inducing dissemination[ ]as opposed to creation”8—both creators
and legal systems want to ensure the same end. Both want works to be cre-
ated and disseminated to their audiences rather than kept in the minds or
storage spaces of creative people.
But can intellectual property help achieve this end? Does it, on net, do
so? And how might intellectual property be changed to advance the shared
interest of creators and policymakers in the creation and dissemination of
creative works?
The Eureka Myth provides authentic, if not always straightforward, an-
swers to these questions. And in presenting the perspective of creators, it
3. Taylor Swift, To Apple, Love Taylor, Tumblr (June 21, 2015), http://taylorswift.tumblr
.com/post/122071902085/to-apple-love-taylor [http://perma.cc/8YP6-S6BL].
4. See Tom Conrad (@tconrad), Twitter (June 22, 2015, 10:37 AM), https://twitter.
com/tconrad/status/613038036880744448 [https://perma.cc/F9VD-DCVD].
5. See pp. 287, 290.
6. This and the other names used throughout this Review are pseudonyms provided by
Silbey to protect the privacy of her subjects. P. 297.
7. See p. 1.
8. P. 222 (quoting Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (emphasis omitted)).
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provides much more—namely, accounts of how factors like serendipity, cir-
cumstance, and hard work really matter. It shows glimpses of the impor-
tance to creators of space, time, and the freedom to work on projects that
one believes are worthwhile. It does so in an age in which declines in the cost
of communication, content discovery, and replication9 are presenting cre-
ators with many more pathways, users, and uses in disseminating their work,
even as intellectual property’s default is to exclude them.
The result is a distillation of what, in their own words, creators want
and the degree to which intellectual property does or does not align with
these desires. While many commentators purport to represent the interests
of artists and inventors, the creators that Silbey interviews speak for them-
selves throughout the book. Their experiences endow Silbey’s observations
and findings with an authenticity that other accounts lack. In the paragraphs
that follow I draw from them and describe how in many cases they chal-
lenge, and in some others they support, traditional notions of intellectual
property. Extending from this base, I bring other voices into the conversa-
tion—including related narratives, historical and modern empirical studies,
and my own research—to consider what an intellectual property system
keenly attuned to the needs of creators might look like, while recognizing
that creators are not the only important constituency the intellectual prop-
erty system needs to care about.
What creators want isn’t all that surprising: freedom, credit, and rela-
tionships with their audiences and customers. What intellectual property
offers is also fairly straightforward: the right to exclude, including the right
to pursue legal actions against others for copying, misappropriating, or
treading on one’s work. These are not the same, as Chapter 3, entitled
“Making Do with a Mismatch” recounts in detail, but the degree of match
varies widely. In some of the cases Silbey reviews, intellectual property is
perceived to be critical to support a protected space in which research and
creative agendas can thrive (p. 217). In other contexts, intellectual property
is just one of many factors that matter to creators; other times it is entirely
beside the point.10 In yet other cases, intellectual property sends the wrong
message (“go away”) and actually undermines creators by, for example, de-
terring the audiences they are trying to reach or Pareto suboptimally dis-
couraging paid or free uses that would benefit both licensee and licensor.11
Across these scenarios, what creators seek is an accurate expression of their
desires. They seek the ability to deploy intellectual property flexibly to
9. For an overview of the technologies that have reduced the cost of creating, distribut-
ing, and reproducing (i.e. the internet, 3D printing, synthetic biology, and robotics), see Mark
A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 460, 468–81 (2015).
10. See pp. 81–82.
11. See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation:
Causal Evidence from the Courts 30 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2247011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247011 [http://perma.cc/GH2P-37QQ]
(concluding, based on their analysis, that some—potentially feasible—licensing failure is tak-
ing place insofar as deals that would benefit both parties are not taking place in the presence of
patent protection).
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achieve their desired ends of complete exclusion, complete inclusion, and
everything in between. They want choice, and they want control.
In order to support creators’ desires for freedom, credit, and audiences
during a time of declining communication, marketing, production, and re-
production costs, policymakers could consider reorienting intellectual prop-
erty to better support goals other than exclusion. Making it easier for
potential sellers and buyers of works to find each other, building more relia-
bility into existing contract-based sharing regimes, and making paid and
unpaid sharing easier—including through orphan-works reform and sup-
porting licensing, defensive patenting, and humanitarian or public-domain
dedication, as others have suggested—could go far to enhance creators’ rep-
utations and audiences’ freedom to play and ability to get paid. Encouraging
users and others to give accurate credit to creators—by taking attribution
into account when copyright is enforced, enforcing commitments to attri-
bute, and codifying best practices in attribution, as others have considered—
would create a better alignment between U.S. intellectual property law and
the expressive and personhood desires of creators and their audiences. Below
I describe what The Eureka Myth and related works say about what creators
want, and the implications of those desires for intellectual property.
I. What Creators Want
The primary purpose of intellectual property law is to motivate the pro-
duction and dissemination of artistic, scientific, and technological works.12
But to induce authors and inventors to take such steps requires an under-
standing of what motivates them. The first part of this essay distills the
desires expressed by Silbey’s subjects.  Across a broad swath of fields, set-
tings, and creative endeavors, creators expressed three desires: freedom,
credit, and audiences.
A. Freedom
Freedom is essential to the creative process. Below, I describe how three
freedoms—freedom to do meaningful work; freedom to play, borrow, and
build upon; and freedom through revenue generation—and their pursuit
define the substance and process of creation.
1. Freedom to Do Meaningful Work
“Autonomy, mastery, and purpose” motivate creative people to do their
best work, according to Daniel Pink’s well-known book, Drive.13 Among
12. E.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 Va. L. Rev.
1750–52 (2012).
13. Daniel H. Pink, Drive 80 (2009). See generally Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci,
Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and
Well-Being, 55 Am. Psychologist 68, 68 (2000) (describing how satisfaction of the basic
human needs for “competence, autonomy, and relatedness,” motivates people); Teresa
Amabile & Steve Kramer, What Doesn’t Motivate Creativity Can Kill It, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Apr.
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Silbey’s subjects, the freedom they feel while they work is the “common
defining pleasure.” Common themes include the freedom to play, the free-
dom to have fun, and the freedom to make things (p. 41). Freedom also
means autonomy and control, including control over one’s schedule and
control over the content of what one works on.
Many of Silbey’s subjects value freedom and flexibility more than
money and are willing to take less pay (though, notably, not no pay) for
more freedom (p. 44). As Thomas, a software engineer and entrepreneur,
said:
The one thing that my job has always given me is a lot of flexibility and a
lot of room. And I appreciated that a lot, because I could do pretty much
anything I wanted, and I could pursue any projects that I wanted. So that,
at that time, meant more to me than additional money. (p. 43)
Programs at well-run companies seek to free up the time of their em-
ployees by offering time-saving perks like on-site fitness centers, childcare,
and subsidized food.14 Similarly, the nature of the creative process means
that there are particular freedoms important to creators that intellectual
property can either support or hinder.
2. Freedom to Play, Borrow, and Build Upon
The freedom to play and to discover is particularly important during the
early stages of creating. Leo, a well-known visual artist, started out as a law-
yer who entertained ideas of becoming a writer. While playing and experi-
menting with different sorts of paint materials in his kitchen in the evenings,
he devised a new way of making paintings (p. 42). Another subject, Ted,
talked about the “juvenile delinquents” at his bioengineering company that
try to break stuff and come up with new inventions and discoveries in the
process and are among the most prolific inventors in his company (pp.
42–43). Play can be motivated by a desire to solve a problem, but the result
is often serendipitous, like Leo’s paint technique. It was never the goal; it just
happened.
The freedom to play is closely related to the freedom to draw upon and
be inspired by others. Silbey’s interviewees are the first to acknowledge that
their talents are not just in creating completely new ideas from whole cloth,
but also in “bringing ideas from different areas together,” or the ability to
“tweak, move [ ] around, adapt [content] . . . and then add in” other content
(p. 47). One subject laments the decline of creative works made from
scratch, as technology makes it easier and easier to create works that reflect
“an accumulation, a compilation, [and] a conglomeration of different ele-
ments” (p. 48). But her observation flows from a well-established sense of
25, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/04/balancing-the-four-factors-tha-1 [https://perma.cc/P2SF-
8YPC] (describing the importance of intrinsic motivation to creativity).
14. See, e.g., 100 Best Companies to Work For 2015, Fortune, http://fortune.com/best-
companies/sas-institute-4/ [http://perma.cc/92YV-67RS] (listing SAS Institute as the fourth
best company to work for).
1086 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1081
the creative process as highly iterative in nature, and the creative outputs, at
times, are as inevitable as they are tremendous. Calculus, evolution, and dec-
imal fractions are a few of the many example of inventions created simulta-
neously by groups of inventors.15
By its nature, intellectual property places limits, sometimes significant
ones, on the freedom of innovators to innovate freely, without worrying
about getting the requisite permissions. Take the example of patents, in par-
ticular software patents—which many, including one of the nation’s most
prominent venture capitalists—view to be “a major inhibitor of innova-
tion.”16 Surveys I have done have found that patent assertions, primarily by
patent trolls, have caused companies to pivot away from, discontinue, and
stop selling products.17 A handful of other studies have found that they also
reduce R&D.18
In fact, it is the freedom from assertions, rather than the conventional
“incentive” to innovate story, that motivate a number of Silbey’s subjects to
amass their own intellectual property, consistent with the existing literature.
For example, 59 percent of 765 research-and-development managers sur-
veyed by Cohen and his colleagues indicated that preventing suits or defen-
sive objectives motived the acquisition of their last product innovation
patent.19 Companies in technology sectors, initially spurred by the licensing
campaigns of Texas Instruments and IBM, now routinely engage in defensive
patenting,20 where innovation is cumulative and incremental. This gives
their engineers and scientists the freedom to play, experiment, and use any
starting materials, developed in-house or elsewhere, that they desire. Silbey’s
interviews confirm that defensive or portfolio patenting is used not only in
15. William F. Ogburn & Dorothy Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable? A Note on Social
Evolution, 37 Pol. Sci. Q. 83, 83 (1922).
16. Fred Wilson, Permissionless Innovation and Patents, AVC (Feb. 19, 2010),  http://avc.
com/2010/02/permissionless-innovation-and-patents/ [https://perma.cc/9NW3-B5LA].
17. See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 461 (2014).
18. See Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 4 (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/15-
002_6806e22c-a7a6-45d8-bf1a-78cad85f20f5.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBW8-9YNJ]; Roger
Smeets, Does Patent Litigation Reduce Corporate R&D? An Analysis of US Public Firms 2–5
(Tilburg Univ., Working Paper, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2443048 [https://perma.cc/6TN9-QEA6].
19. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) fig.7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf [https://perma.cc/
82RQ-7LKN]; see also Sadao Nagaoka & John P. Walsh, Commercialization and Other Uses of
Patents in Japan and the U.S.: Major Findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech Inventor Survey
fig.13 (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade and Indus., Discussion Paper No. 09-E-011, 2009),
www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e011.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BEE-DMJC] (finding that,
among respondents to a survey in the United States of inventors of “triadic patents”—patents
whose applications were filed in both the Japan Patent Office and the European Patent Office
and granted in the United States Patent and Trademark Office—45 percent indicated that
purely defensive motives were highly important in their acquisition of patents).
20. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 Hastings L.J. 297, 304–10 (2010).
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high tech, but also in the biosciences. As Dennis, who works at a publicly-
traded, global pharmaceutical company, explains to his scientists:
I agree that this subject matter likely shouldn’t be patentable. But . . . right
now, it is being patented by other people, and we’re having to analyze their
patents, spend tens of thousands of dollars analyzing them, rendering
opinions, telling business people they have to make business risks based
upon infringement issues. And . . . we’re taking licenses. . . . What I want is
something that I can trade with somebody . . . I’m not interested in neces-
sarily asserting these against anybody. (pp. 44–45; last omission added)
3. Freedom Through Revenue Generation
Even when intellectual property is not the primary motivator for indi-
viduals engaged in creative or inventive endeavors, it can play an instrumen-
tal role in securing them the freedom they seek. Meredith, a talent agent that
Silbey interviews, describes the freedom licensing a song for a commercial
can provide her client, a folk singer: “[b]y doing a thirty-second spot like
that, she’ll get more money in the next year than she’d get from her record
label in six years . . . . This was going to be money that she could make
without leaving her house” (p. 214; omission in original). In other cases,
intellectual property is critical to the existence of a company, especially in
the absence of other proxies for innovative output or potential. Patents can
provide a check on “inflated view[s] of what [the invention is] worth” (p.
212; alterations in original). In the words of one of the venture capitalists
Silbey interviewed, patents give investors greater confidence to commit re-
sources to projects that lack revenue or customers. Thus while Silbey’s sense
is that “IP simply does not cross the minds of the[ ] creative or innovative
clients [of IP lawyers]” (p. 191), “the entitlements that flow from the work
as IP (e.g. revenue, exclusive use) [may] arise . . . after legal intervention” (p.
192).
In this sense, intellectual property can create breathing space, the ability
to take risks and make long-term investments, and room to experiment away
from the day-to-day pressure to generate revenue. This sentiment is sup-
ported by some historical studies of patent and copyright. The introduction
of copyright in Italy ushered in a large increase in the quantity and quality of
opera production as composers were able to benefit from repeat perform-
ances, and were incentivized to produce enduring works, Giorcelli and
Moser found.21 Empirical historical studies that consider the introduction of
patents, as well as the relative performance of countries that do and don’t
21. Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyright and Creativity: Evidence from Italian
Operas (May 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2505776 [http://perma.cc/7FPW-TDQP].
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have them, suggest that, if anything, patents influence the direction and dif-
fusion of innovations rather than directly influencing the number of inven-
tions.22 Moser found no increase in the number of new rose varieties
introduced after the creation of U.S. plant patents in 1930 even though a
large share of patents covered roses.23 U.S. multinationals respond to
stronger intellectual property regimes abroad by “significantly increasing
technology transfer to reforming countries.”24 However, increased transfer
does not necessarily generate greater social welfare if it is associated with a
higher-than-necessary social costs.
Still, the role of intellectual property must be understood in context.
The serendipity that Silbey’s subjects experience is reflected in the well-doc-
umented skew in the value of copyrighted and patented works. Most works
have little commercial value and are not worth affirmatively protecting with
copyright25 or a full patent term.26 One of Silbey’s subjects, Dennis, “has
great respect for the amount of time it takes to make a useful and novel
discovery, and he understands how rarely it happens” (p. 232). Patent values
are so unpredictable that patents are called “lottery tickets,”27 because their
value depends on many factors beyond the merits of the invention or artistic
work. Decades may elapse before an initial discovery is commercialized. In
fact, 153 years passed between the first patentable version of the jet engine
and its eventual commercialization,28 and it took more than two centuries
for the insight that scurvy could be prevented by the vitamin C in citrus to
fully diffuse.29 Though scurvy was the leading cause of death among sailors
22. Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History, J. Econ.
Persp., Winter 2013, at 23; see Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System, S. Cal. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
23. Moser, supra note 22, at 28.
24. Lee G. Branstetter et al., Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International
Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Panel Data, 121 Q. J. Econ. 321,
347 (2006) (concluding that U.S. multinationals increased technology transfer to reforming
countries with stronger IPR regimes and documenting an increase in royalty payments and
research-and-development expenditures by multinationals after intellectual property reforms
were adopted in sixteen countries); see Mercedes Delgado et al., Intellectual Property Protection
and the Geography of Trade, 61 J. Indus. Econ. 733 (2013) (finding increased trade flows in
intellectual-property-intensive sectors following the implementation of treaty provisions about
international intellectual property).
25. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 512–14
(2004) (describing surveys showing that only 21 percent of library works in 1908 and less than
a third of posters from 1976 were copyrighted).
26. FiveIPoffices, IP5 Statistics Report, fig.4.8 (2013), http://www.fiveipoffices.org/sta-
tistics/statisticsreports/2013edition/ip5sr2013corr.pdf [http://perma.cc/V34T-E94U] (showing
that less than half of U.S. patents, and far fewer international patents, are renewed through
their full potential term).
27. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 24
(2005) (explaining the lottery theory of patents).
28. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ.
265, 271–72 (1977).
29. Frederick Mosteller, Innovation and Evaluation, 211 Science 881, 881–82 (Feb. 27,
1981).
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at the time of the first successful experiment in 1601, the general that fed his
sailors three teaspoons of lemon juice a day was not a doctor.30 Vitamin C’s
merits were confirmed 150 years later, but it would take another 120 years
for the antidote to become widespread.31
Despite the emphasis in patent and copyright law on novelty and origi-
nality, exactly who reaps the rewards often depends on other factors—first-
mover advantages, economies of scale, network effects,32 relationships with
others (p. 28), randomness (p. 29), and marketing (p. 160). Serendipity may
explain why even those who benefit from intellectual property aren’t neces-
sarily motivated by it ex ante. Jennifer was a salaried journalist who sold her
book to a publisher and was able to live off the royalties (p. 29). Andrew was
able to leverage his patent portfolio to get venture capital and eventually sell
his business to a public company (p. 30). But based on probing these out-
comes in depth, Silbey concludes, “these intellectual property jackpots were
by no means preordained,” nor did they provide the initial motivation for
the work that led to them (p. 30). Studies of technology transactions and
why they often fail have found that uncertainty about the value of the un-
derlying work is compounded by uncertainty about the existence and value
of the intellectual property.33 As Kevin, a high-tech entrepreneur, put it,
“[t]he big problem in business with patents is that the implications are to-
tally unquantifiable. What is it going to cost us—well, what are the odds we
get sued? Impossible to figure out. What’s the likely outcome? . . . Patents?
Completely unquantifiable.”34
Numerous studies appear to confirm the intuition that the returns to
creative endeavors are by and large too uncertain to make much of a differ-
ence ex ante when intellectual property is extended.35 In 1980, for example,
the Bayh-Dole Act made it easier for universities to patent federally-funded
inventions.36 The cancer drug Alimta37 and the Cohen-Boyer DNA tech-
niques are among the numerous technologies that have been licensed since
the Bayh-Dole Act.38 The Association of University Technology Managers
30. Id. at 881.
31. Id. at 881–82, 886 n.5.
32. See Peter Thiel, Zero to One 48–53, 57–58 (2014).
33. E.g., Joshua S. Gans et al., The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the
Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54 Mgmt. Sci. 982, 983–85 (2008).
34. P. 89. But see Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 283
(2011) (arguing, based on an empirical analysis, that intrinsic and extrinsic factors can be used
to predict the likelihood that a patent will be litigated).
35. See, e.g., Time to Fix Patents, Economist (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21660522-ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rotten-way-rewarding-
them-time-fix [http://perma.cc/9MBX-CPJG].
36. Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The
World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 Res. Pol’y 772, 778 (2006).
37. Samantha Chaifetz et al., Closing the Access Gap for Health Innovations: An Open
Licensing Proposal for Universities, 3 Globalization and Health, no. 1, 2007, http://
www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1744-8603-3-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/CR7Z-FF2F].
38. Sampat, supra note 36, at 783.
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credits the Act with the development of an impressive number of new vac-
cines and drugs.39 But well before the Bayh-Dole Act, universities were devis-
ing and disseminating their inventions through a variety of mechanisms
such as publication and institutional agreements.40 The pursuit of the next
great invention, but typically without its achievement, has resulted in the
vast majority of technology transfer offices running at a deficit.41 An inde-
pendent review of university innovation before and after Bayh-Dole con-
cluded that there was little evidence that increased licensing and university
patenting led to meaningful growth in the economic contributions of uni-
versities.42 Reviewing a number of metastudies of changes in the patent law,
Boldrin and Levine likewise have found, “weak or no evidence that strength-
ening patent regimes increases innovation; they find evidence that strength-
ening the patent regime increases . . . patenting.”43
Those who have studied variations in the strength of copyright draw a
similar conclusion regarding their impact. A study of fifty changes in U.S.
copyright law effected by Congress and the Supreme Court between 1870
and 2006 found that the relationship between laws that change copyright
and the registration of new works was “essentially random.”44 Of the other
factors the authors considered, population was the best and most reliable
predictor of the number of works produced.45 Like Silbey’s subjects, these
studies suggest that the impact on creators of changes in intellectual prop-
erty is often hard to predict at best and nonexistent at worst. It’s also worth
bearing in mind that while the freedom that money provides to creators is
important to them, it is far from guaranteed that commercial success will
follow intellectual property acquisition. As Scott, one of Silbey’s subjects,
said, “How are we gonna derive [economic] value from our activities? . . .
Well the only way we’re gonna do it is if we can convince people to buy the
product and if we can build a good product, and make it work, and that’s all
people driven” (p. 275; alterations and omissions in original). The relevance
39. See Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, The Bayh-Dole Act: It’s Working, http://
www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/BayhDoleTalkingPointsFINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EP3D-8KDA] (“Thanks to the research conducted at U.S. universities, and to
technology transfer, over the past 30 years, 153 new FDA approved vaccines, drugs and/or new
indications for existing drugs were discovered through research carried out in public sector
research institutions, consisting of 93 small molecule drugs, 36 biologics, 15 vaccines, 8 in vivo
diagnostics and 1 over-the-counter (OTC) drug. This would not have been possible without
the Bayh-Dole Act.” (footnote omitted)).
40. Sampat, supra note 36, at 773–76.
41. Nat’l Research Council, Managing University Intellectual Property in the
Public Interest, 24 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011); see also Walter D.
Valdivia, University Start-Ups: Critical for Improving Technology Transfer, 9
(Joshua Bleiberg et al. eds., 2013).
42. Sampat, supra note 36, at 773, 781–86.
43. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly 192
(2008) (omission in original).
44. Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical
Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1669, 1673 (2009).
45. Id. at 1673–74.
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of intellectual property to reputation for recruitment is described in greater
detail below.
B. Credit / Reputation
The most important thing to professional creators, Silbey finds, is their
reputation (p. 149). Reputational interests are complex. They reflect pecuni-
ary interests in a day and age in which Twitter account holders can monetize
their followers46 and creators and companies have personhood interests in
ensuring that their reputation or brand authentically reflects the image that
they want to project.47 Reputational interests do not always map cleanly onto
intellectual property rights: for example, in Silbey’s interviews, the “desire to
be known as someone who contributes good ideas” is not necessarily tied to
any particular work (p. 168).
The ever-closer connection between creators and their audiences made
possible by the growth of social media makes the cultivation and protection
of a company’s brand or an artist’s reputation one of their most important
priorities—one that can take precedence over any interest in exclusion. Cre-
ators want attention,48 and they want credit for their contributions. But
more importantly they want accurate credit—a desire reflected outside of
the United States primarily through “moral rights” doctrines such as the
right “to claim authorship” of a work (the right of attribution) and the right
“to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification” of a work
that would harm the author’s reputation (the right of integrity).49
Because trademark law protects corporations against uses that are likely
to cause consumer confusion, corporate reputational and brand interests are
also strong. Silbey’s subjects describe trademarks as “priceless asset[s]” (pp.
160–62), and survey results confirm that trademarks outrank copyright and
patent rights.50 The perceived importance of a company’s brand can lead to
overreach, Silbey documents, as her subjects describe their assertion of
trademark rights in cases where they don’t have them in order to avoid un-
wanted associations.51 Susan, a university licensing officer, for example,
46. Elijah Daniel, 5 Services to Help You Earn Money from Your Twitter Account, Mash-
able (Feb. 11, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/02/11/twitter-services-money/#Ignm4ZalPiq3
[http://perma.cc/F3XT-ERP8].
47. See pp. 149–50.
48. Michael H. Goldhaber, Attention Shoppers! The Currency of the New Economy Won’t
Be Money, but Attention—A Radical Theory of Value, Wired, Dec. 1, 1997, http://
www.wired.com/1997/12/es-attention/ [https://perma.cc/J8UZ-CKPZ].
49. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 art. 6 bis, July 24, 1971, 102 Stat.
2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.
50. John E. Jankowski, Business Use of Intellectual Property Protection Documented in NSF
Survey, Nat’l Sci. Found. fig.2 (Feb. 2012), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf12307/
[http://perma.cc/BZM9-GWD9] (showing trademarks to be ranked ahead of copyrights, de-
sign patents, patents, and mask works in importance among companies).
51. See p. 161.
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polices nonconfusing behavior that is not likely actionable under trademark
law:
We get involved because we’ve been given the responsibility of the use of
the name. That is, when Sony pictures wanted to film [a bad movie
here]. . . . [W]e didn’t want to let them, even  though . . . it was a true
story, it did happen [here]. We didn’t want to let them, because we didn’t
want to be associated with [that kind of] picture. (p. 161; alterations and
omissions in original)
1. Credit
In this Section, I discuss the intertwined desires of creators and the in-
stitutions that support them for credit, accurate attribution, and favorable
reputation by association. The desire to be recognized, separate from the
desire to be compensated, is pervasive among creators. Corporate inventor-
reward programs like one that Silbey describes, which symbolically rewards
employees who invent with silver dollars (p. 159), have long been used to
give credit to inventors.52 Naming credit on scientific papers, which is often
shared among groups of authors, is another way to recognize disparate con-
tributions within a scientific cohort and to strengthen relationships and co-
hesiveness within the group (pp. 166–67). There are complex hierarchies for
assigning credits to some creative works. Movies, for example, have both
opening and closing credits and name those who contribute to the movie’s
production under a number of titles including producer, executive producer,
co-producer, line producer, unit production manager, production supervi-
sor, production coordinator, and associate producer.53 Where and how an
actor or director’s name shows up in the credits are negotiated terms,54 and
experimental studies suggest that creators are willing to give up significant
financial benefits in exchange for receiving credit for their work.55
Even when creators want to share their copyrighted works for free, they
want credit. Creative Commons is an organization that facilitates the sharing
of works through the development of licenses that authors can place onto
52. According to U.S. patent law, the inventions of employees that are “hired to invent”
belong to the employer, without any requirement to compensate the inventor for their pat-
ented contributions. Sean M. O’Connor, Hired to Invent vs. Work Made for Hire: Resolving the
Inconsistency Among Rights of Corporate Personhood, Authorship, and Inventorship, 35 Seattle
U. L. Rev. 1227, 1240 (2012). Countries like Japan and Germany, in contrast, obligate employ-
ers to remunerate their employees for their inventions. Japan Patent Office, Theory and
Practice of Employees’ Invention (2006), http://www.training-jpo.go.jp/en/images_x/
uploads/text_vtr/pdf/4-05.pdf [http://perma.cc/88JK-PA2W].
53. John August, Producer Credits and What They Mean, Johnaugust.com (Oct. 21,
2004), http://johnaugust.com/2004/producer-credits-and-what-they-mean [http://perma.cc/
Y6SA-4D8Q].
54. Ben Schott, Opinion Art, Assembling the Billing Block, N.Y. Times (Feb. 23, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/02/24/opinion/sunday/ben-schott-movies-billing-
blocks.html [http://perma.cc/6TGH-PKUQ].
55. Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the
Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1389, 1417 (2013).
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their works.56 Of the nearly 1 billion pieces of content that have been li-
censed under Creative Commons, 96 percent have been licensed under
terms that require the user of the work to give credit to the author.57 Widely
used free and open-source software licenses give up copyright protections
for attribution obligations.58 Studies of Wikipedia contributors, stand-up
comics, and chefs have documented the relative importance of attribution to
these creators.59
Sometimes a creator’s interest in getting credit can clash with a distribu-
tor’s interest in revenue generation. Growing the reputation of an author
may be accomplished by the widespread dissemination of her work at zero
cost, but doing so may cannibalize the market for paid reads and may alter-
natively be favored by the distributor60 or the author.61
Putting aside the propriety of making a copy of work, there is a sense
that failing to give credit independently harms the creator. In a recent survey
of 443 members of the public, 62 percent of respondents believed that pro-
viding proper attribution should excuse the free copying of others’ copyright
content.62 This finding is striking because it elevates attributional interests
over copyright interests and reflects an incorrect understanding of the law.63
2. Accurate Attribution
Preventing misattribution may be even more important to creators than
getting credit. The lawyers Silbey talks to describe their clients’ unwillingness
to license copyrights or trademarks because they don’t want to give up con-
trol over the work (p. 156). Sidley recounts that when Steve Jobs initially
decided to incur a financial loss by not licensing the characters from Toy
Story to Disney, he did so to prevent Disney “from making bad sequels and
56. See About the License, Creative Commons, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
[https://perma.cc/E8DU-V5N4] (showing a variety of licenses, all indicating that less than all
copyright rights are reserved to the author and designating which audiences or rights are being
given up).
57. State of the Commons, Creative Commons, https://stateof.creativecommons.org/re-
port/ [https://perma.cc/S9B2-AD7H] (graphic indicating that CC0, the only Creative Com-
mons license that does not require attribution, has been adopted to cover 4 percent the 882
million pieces of CC-licensed content in 2014).
58. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. Rev.
41, 59 (2007).
59. See Sprigman et al., supra note 55, at 1398–99, for a review.
60. See, e.g., Swift, supra note 3.
61. Lastowka, supra note 58, at 41 (quoting Ralph R. Shaw, Copyright and the Right to
Credit, 113 Science 571, 572 (1951)).
62. Gregory N. Mandel et al., Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy 30 (Temple
Univ. Beasley Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2015-22, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2588658 [http://perma.cc/8SDN-Q2K2].
63. Id. at 3, 13. The authors also find that this reflects a deep-seated misperception of
intellectual property’s purpose—that it is designed to prevent plagiarism or uncredited copy-
ing, when in reality it prohibits only unauthorized copying (with or without attribution). See
id. at 16.
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unseemly merchandise” (pp. 156–57). In his own words, “[t]hat would have
been like molesting our children” (p. 157). Brand and control are closely
intertwined; in the words of Barbara, a famous author, when ghostwriters
are used on her sequels, she maintains “very close control . . . . My name is
on the books” (p. 165; omission in original).
The desire for accurate attribution and control goes back to the expres-
sive and personal interests that creators have in their works. As one of the
painters Silbey interviewed explains:
Ultimately . . . I paint because I want to share . . . my sense of how I see the
world, how I see color, with other people. I think I’ve got to . . . not be
totally possessive about that . . . [A]s long as someone was [copying me] in
a way that I felt was up to the quality [it might be OK] . . . but if you think
they are degrading your work, that’s [another] thing. (p. 76; alterations and
omissions in original)
3. Favorable Reputation by Association
Expressive and commercial interests are also implicated when it comes
to whom a creator is associated with. Steven Tyler of Aerosmith, the mem-
bers of R.E.M., and Neil Young have all complained about the use of their
songs in Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential bid due to a concern, at least in
the case of Mr. Tyler, that the use implies endorsement.64 Concern about the
use of a work in ways that are offensive to the author discourages some to
share their works as well.65 The desire to be closer, as well as further, from
something can also be strong. As a musician interviewed for the book de-
scribed, the decision to sign with a particular label was motivated by the
desire to be associated with its brand: “I have tremendous respect for [the
label]. They are small, but they are one of the leading . . . labels. . . . . There’s
so much crap, you know? . . . The label thing just sets you apart . . . .” (p.
158; first and third omissions in original).
Reputation matters to existing and potential employees as well. Compa-
nies can recruit the best only when employees feel affinity for the company’s
mission. In Chapter 5, Silbey documents the tension between lawyers, who
may be perceived as obstructionist, secretive, and exclusionary, and the
scientists and engineers within firms whose impulse is to share and collabo-
rate (pp. 184–220). In-house lawyer Jacqueline describes “a very long and
difficult process of changing the mind-set at [the company]—and I think at
other companies, too—from hoarding the true essence of your technology
to wanting to share it with the world, because you realized the tremendous
impact of what you were doing” (p. 202). In public statements, innovative
companies like Google, Twitter, and Tesla have distanced themselves from
64. Ben Sisario, In Choreographed Campaigns, Candidates Stumble Over Choice of Music,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/us/politics/in-choreograph
ed-campaigns-candidates-stumble-over-choice-of-music.html [https://perma.cc/Z97J-ZJUY].
65. See Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property
Rights, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1935, 1975 (2014).
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the pursuit of patents because of their traditional association with exclu-
sion.66 In a blog post entitled “All Our Patent Are Belong To You,” Elon
Musk disclaimed offensive uses of Tesla’s patents in order to make clear that
they did not reflect a desire to exclude.67 He did so apparently to bolster the
firm’s reputation among its employees, writing:
Technology leadership is not defined by patents, which history has repeat-
edly shown to be small protection indeed against a determined competitor,
but rather by the ability of a company to attract and motivate the world’s
most talented engineers. We believe that applying the open source philoso-
phy to our patents will strengthen rather than diminish Tesla’s position in
this regard.68
Just as the freedom to draw from the best materials is important for individ-
ual creators, a company’s success depends on the creative people it attracts
to its projects.
Intellectual property policies can also enhance the reputation of a com-
pany. For example, defensive patenting can communicate a firm’s ability to
retaliate or signal to the market the firm’s worth. As Andrew, a software
entrepreneur interviewed by Silbey, described:
there is [sic] typically one or two ideas that are really valuable. . . . And
then the company ends up getting a dozen or two dozen patents. The rest
of them are just the blocking stuff—or not even that: they’re just some-
thing you build to look very attractive to a potential buyer. But they’re not
real . . . . (p. 208–09; first omission in original)
Accumulating a large patent portfolio can be very lucrative: “[Company X]
had a huge patent portfolio. And that’s where they did this trick. They had
an in-house patent lawyer, and he really created value. . . . People looked at
that company, the potential buyers, and said, ‘Wow! This company has one
hundred issued US [sic] patents . . . .’ ” (p. 110; alteration and first omis-
sion in original). Intellectual property can help build value, as Donald
describes:
The vision I had when I was the general counsel [was] . . . we knew that we
wanted to sell that company eventually, so I was trying to build value. So
literally, we . . . had one thousand or two thousand registered trademarks,
we had at least two thousand copyrights, we have fifteen or twenty patents.
(p. 110; alteration and omissions in original)
66. See Adam Messinger, Introducing the Innovator’s Patent Agreement, Twitter Blog
(Apr. 17, 2012, 17:00 UTC), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-innovators-patent-
agreement [https://perma.cc/7S8W-FHJQ]; Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You,
Tesla Motors Blog (June 12, 2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-
belong-you [http://perma.cc/N5ZM-ADLR].
67. See Musk, supra note 66.
68. Id.
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C. Audiences
One reason reputation is so important to creators is that it is related to
their ability to get another thing they desire: audiences or customers for
their creations. Silbey discusses the importance to creators of various rela-
tionships.69 Relationships with audiences in particular provide encourage-
ment, meaning, feedback, and freedom. Social scientists Ryan and Deci have
identified “relatedness” as a basic human need that motivates when paired
with “competence” and “autonomy.”70
Audiences inspire and they encourage. In the words of one software en-
trepreneur, one of his “biggest motivation[s] is people. Because once you get
real consumers, you can actually talk to them on the phone, and if they like
what you do . . . that’s what really kept me going” (p. 231; omission and
alteration in original). Audiences feed and nurture the creative process. Bar-
bara, a prolific author of children’s books, keeps letters and pictures of her
adolescent fans around her desk, Silbey reports, to create “a safe and encour-
aging workspace” (p. 56). Fans may also provide a sense of purpose and
meaning, which can best be fulfilled for one artist Silbey interviewed, when
she is performing for a live audience. As Mary describes, “when the room is
quiet and people are just right there, there is a circuit of energy where you
wind up with more energy at the end of the show because you feel like in
some tiny way, you have been of service” (p. 244).
Audiences also lead to revenue and freedom. As Richard, a global
health-fund director at a pharmaceutical company, put it, “[w]e want to
have an impact on health care, but we also have to make a return on invest-
ment” (p. 231). Having a product circulate generates the feedback and en-
gagement that are needed for products to improve iteratively.71 Relationships
with audiences can create enduring revenue streams. Though an individual
work can be copied or pirated, a direct relationship with an audience makes
it easier to promote, for example, a book or movie character who has been
redeployed within video games, comic books, or other media.72 Silbey dis-
cerns at least five distinct modes of distribution, ranging from the “many
and more” strategy—in which creators seek to distribute as many copies of
their work as possible, preferably through paid methods—to the “nondis-
tribution” or, “hold-out” category, in which the work is distributed spar-
ingly, if at all (pp. 225–26). What creators want can be counterintuitive.
Rather than the widest dissemination, some creators are seeking discerning
audiences, who can support and fund continuing creative endeavors.73
69. E.g., pp. 137–40.
70. Ryan & Deci, supra note 13, at 68.
71. See p. 233.
72. See p. 240.
73. See p. 228.
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II. How Intellectual Property Can Be Supplemented to Give
Creators What They Want
That three of the things creators really want are freedom, credit, and
audiences is unlikely to surprise many. But using these concepts, rather than
the legal constructs of intellectual property and exclusion, as starting points,
will help ensure that creative interests are represented in discussions about
policy in a way that is truthful, rather than oversimplistic. By and large,
Silbey’s creators are less motivated by the ability to exclude others, or the
possibility of a huge payout, and much more focused on the process: dedi-
cating time to their craft and doing day-to-day work. As world-renowned
visual artist Chuck Close has said, “[i]nspiration is for amateurs. The rest of
us just show up and get to work.”74 In a similar vein, the influence of intel-
lectual property on the day-to-day lives of creators should not be overstated.
Thus, while it is usually assumed that creators benefit from stronger
intellectual property provisions, Silbey’s subjects, and the studies cited
above, explain why the relationship between creators and intellectual prop-
erty is more complicated. The availability of intellectual property creates se-
curity for a number of business models and can enable long-term
investments in creation and innovation. It does not follow, however, that
more intellectual property is necessarily better. On the contrary, the evi-
dence cited above suggests that the overall returns to strengthening intellec-
tual property are uncertain at best and negative at worst, though they can
influence the direction and diffusion of innovations. Silbey’s subjects explain
in their own words why this is the case. The uncertainty and serendipity of
the creative process limits any ex ante impact, even when the ex post rewards
may turn out to be great.
Intellectual property also interferes, limiting the freedom creators have
to play and the dissemination of their creative works by others to the audi-
ences that they want.  For example, the fact that intellectual property’s de-
fault entitlements are set wrong or inefficiently75 results in a loss to follow-
on innovators or users through unnecessary forbearance or the need to “de-
sign around” the invention.76 The losses to creators, however, are also signif-
icant, and arguably more concentrated, when intellectual property’s
exclusionary message sends the wrong signal to followers, future customers,
and future employees whom the creator seeks to cultivate, engage with, and
hire.
While these observations are not necessarily novel, knowing what does
motivate creators can inform attempts to improve intellectual property law.
74. Anna Dorfman, Lessons from Chuck Close, Door Sixteen (Apr. 11, 2012), http://
www.doorsixteen.com/2012/04/11/lessons-from-chuck-close/ [http://perma.cc/A63H-UWY4].
75. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the
Mind 11–12 (2008) (asserting that for most works, the owners expect to recoup value from
the work with five or ten years of exclusive rights, and that the remainder of the term is of little
use except as a kind of “lottery ticket”).
76. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 65, at 1946–50 (lamenting the various types of ineffi-
ciencies that flow from the incorrect initial allocation of rights).
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These motivations can direct policymakers to the shared interests of the
public and creators—for example, greater connection, credit, and freedom
to create. But The Eureka Myth focuses on creation stories rather than legal
reforms. Where Silbey leaves off, this Part picks up.
A. Greater Support for (Paid and Free) Inclusion, Not Just Exclusion
Though intellectual property gives creators the right to exclude, creators
often want to include others.77 Much of the content on several of the in-
ternet’s top websites—Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter78—has
been generated without the expectation of payment and in pursuit of pas-
sion, not profits.79 Sharing or including furthers creative interests by al-
lowing a creator to connect to her audiences, earn their loyalty and
admiration,80 and get their feedback.81 Sharing builds reputation, fame, and
market share,82 as Silbey documents. Even when a service is initially offered
for free, sharing creates paths to eventual revenue streams through
“freemium” and related models, for example.83 When sharing means for-
bearing the exercise of exclusive patent rights, it creates freedom—the free-
dom to operate for follow-on innovators.
Technology is making sharing easier. Among copyright industries, in-
termediaries like Harper Collins and Paramount Pictures, who have tradi-
tionally added value by curating, gatekeeping, and tightly distributing
selected works, are yielding ground to distributors like Amazon, Netflix,
iTunes, and YouTube (p. 224). On these new platforms, content is available
in abundance, anytime, anywhere. The openness of the internet makes it
easier for scientists and engineers to learn from each other and share across
firm boundaries. But that openness can also raise proprietary legal concerns
as the culture clashes between lawyers, scientists, and creators.
The suggestion here is simple: to reorient the intellectual property sys-
tem to better support the desire of creators to include and not only exclude
77. The importance of supporting the right to include has been discussed by others in-
cluding Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property 449 (2d ed. 2012) (“[I]t is im-
portant not only to be able to exclude other persons from the thing, but also to be able to
include other persons in the use and enjoyment of the thing . . . .”) and Daniel B. Kelly, The
Right to Include, 63 Emory L.J. 857 (2014). See also Tim Wu, Tolerated Use (Columbia Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 333, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1132247 [https://perma.cc/PY8A-A2BJ] (describing strategies of “tolerated use” in which
a copyright is violated, but not enforced).
78. List of Most Popular Websites, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_most
_popular_websites [https://perma.cc/AN2M-WQPM].
79. Johnson, supra note 65, at 1959.
80. See p. 252–55.
81. Johnson, supra note 65, at 1994–95.
82. See pp. 121–27.
83. E.g., Fred Wilson, The Freemium Business Model, AVC (Mar. 23, 2006), http://
avc.com/2006/03/the_freemium_bu/ [http://perma.cc/94UJ-GKCU].
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others.84 Potential solutions include supporting existing platforms for shar-
ing, facilitating paid licensing, and sorting goods according to exclusive ver-
sus nonexclusive creator intent. The natural reaction to this idea might be
that creators already have the ability to share through licensing contracts or
through choosing not to enforce their intellectual property rights.85 But the
ability to affirmatively share that Creative Commons offers has been em-
braced widely.86 As described below, existing experiences further demon-
strate that mechanisms for licensing or giving away exclusive rights and,
more generally, for disavowing exclusive uses of intellectual property are less
developed than they could be.
1. Making Existing Sharing Mechanisms More Transparent and Reliable
One problem, for example, with underenforcement, is that it does not
reliably provide freedom to use or operate. Owners have no way to signal
their intention to forbear from enforcement to potential users. Even if an
unlicensed use has been tolerated for a time, an owner’s lack of enforcement
could be due to a lack of knowledge, resources, or desire. Neither the
owner’s reason for not enforcing nor whether he or she will continue to do
so is transparent to the public. In order to avoid stepping on landmines,
risk-averse organizations—including libraries, archives, and other memory
institutions—won’t tread in the first place.87
Even when an owner has taken affirmative steps to signal her intent to
license or not assert intellectual property rights, the commitment in some
cases stops short of providing follow-on innovators with the assurances they
need to make long-term investments. Examples include the nearly one bil-
lion pieces of copyrighted works on Creative Commons,88 the millions of
patents licensed through organizations like the Open Invention Network and
the License on Transfer Network, and other standards-setting organiza-
tions89 that require royalty-limited or royalty-free licensing of patents. The
problem with promises made to the public is that one-way promises are not
84. This suggestion is not original; in fact, it motivated the creation of Creative Com-
mons. Lawrence Lessig, CC in Review: Lawrence Lessig On Supporting the Commons, Creative
Commons (Oct. 6, 2005), http://creativecommons.org/lessig-letters/page/3 [http://perma.cc/
89R6-7SVF] (“The idea (again, stolen from the FSF) was to produce copyright licenses that
artists, authors, educators, and researchers could use to announce to the world the freedoms
that they want their creative work to carry. If the default rule of copyright is ‘all rights re-
served,’ the express meaning of a Creative Commons license is that only ‘some rights [are]
reserved.’ ” (alteration in original)).
85. Paul J. Heald, How Notice-and-Takedown Regimes Create Markets for Music on You-
Tube: An Empirical Study, 83 U. Mo. Kan. City L. Rev. 313, 321 (2014) (describing examples
of tolerated infringement on YouTube).
86. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
87. See David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37
Colum. J.L. & Arts 1, 3 (2013) (“[O]rganizations that cannot obtain permission often do not
make their collections available at all.”).
88. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
89. Chien, supra note 22.
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enforceable unless they induce reasonable reliance.90 Under a federal law de-
signed to protect authors, Creative Commons licenses can be terminated
after a period of time,91 as a number of commentators have lamented.92
A number of ways to build a more reliable “semi-commons” of creative
works have been proposed. For example, grants of copyrights to the public
could be made irrevocable through the extension of the legal doctrine of
abandonment to partial abandonments of rights.93 In the same spirit of “no
takebacks,” I have suggested the creation of a “defensive-only” patent option
that, once elected, would limit any future enforcement of the patent and stay
with the patent through transfer.94 Dedication of works to the public do-
main could also be made easier, including through legitimizing defensive
publication in the patent context and creating easier pathways to effect pub-
lic domain dedication.95 Short of creating new legal doctrines and options
for sharing, our intellectual property system could legitimize pledges to
share by creating a registry where they could be recorded, thereby increasing
the likelihood that a court will find it reasonable to rely on and enforce
them.96
2. Facilitating Licensing
It is also worth considering how to make it easier for willing buyers and
sellers of protected works to form licenses. The practical obstacles to paid or
unpaid licensing are illustrated well in the case of orphan works, “copy-
righted works whose owners cannot be located by a reasonably diligent
90. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981) (“A promise which the prom-
isor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.”).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
92. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright
Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 Harv. J. on Legis. 359, 363–64 (2010);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative
Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 271, 318
(2007).
93. Loren, supra note 92, at 327–28.
94. Chien, supra note 22 (manuscript at 60–63); Colleen Chien, Why It’s Time to Open
Up Our Patent System, Wash. Post (June 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
innovations/wp/2015/06/30/why-its-time-to-open-up-our-patent-system/ [http://perma.cc/
7LNX-RTEG].
95. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 92, at 360–64, 416–23 (arguing for adaptation of
copyright termination provisions with respect to open-content licenses to promote public ben-
efit); Adrienne K. Goss, Note, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative
Commons Project, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 963, 990–96 (2007).
96. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 543 (discussing patent pledges
and the benefits of a national registry for patent pledges); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompli-
ance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45
Hous. L. Rev. 1059, 1084–98 (2008) (discussing the costs, benefits, and sharing norms sur-
rounding the anticommons patent model in academia).
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search.”97 The United Kingdom is estimated to have thirteen to fifty million
orphan works, and a group of scholars has characterized the U.S. problem to
be “at least as bad.”98 In the patent context, there is both unmet supply and
unmet demand for licensing. Invalidation of a patent leads to it being cited
more frequently by subsequent patents,99 and patent holders are willing to
license 70 percent more patents than are currently licensed.100 These failures
impose significant costs on society. The European Union estimates that $20
billion is spent annually to develop already existing innovations.101 And re-
search has found that large numbers of copyrighted works are not circulat-
ing, at least in part, because the entities that want to bring the work to
market cannot secure rights, because they cannot find the rights holder or
because the holder is unwilling to license.102
Reducing information and transaction costs would likely lead to more
licensing of patented and copyrighted works, although the challenges differ
by subject matter and by type of work.103 In order for a license to be formed,
a rights holder needs to be willing to license, contracting parties need to be
able to find each other, and the parties need to agree on a price. While
licensing markets are robust in certain copyrighted goods, the fact that copy-
right arises automatically, without any formalities, means that a complete
public record of copyright ownership and authorship is missing.104 A group
of prominent copyright lawyers has soundly recommended encouraging
standardized registration in public and private registries.105
Markets for patented technology are underdeveloped for many reasons.
The transfer of technology requires both patents and know-how to be trans-
ferred, and the availability of both for licensing is impossible to discern
based on the public record. It can be difficult to unwind the assumption that
97. A Case Study for Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles Project: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 34–35 (2013) (statement of Daniel Gervais, Professor, Vanderbilt University Law
School); Hansen et al., supra note 87, at 3.
98. Hansen et al., supra note 87, at 7.
99. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 30.
100. Alfonso Gambardella et al., The Market for Patents in Europe 2 (LEM, Working Paper
No. 2006/04), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899539 [http://perma.cc/
J7GH-97WX] (reporting that while 18 percent of European patents are offered for licensing,
only 11 percent are actually licensed).
101. Ashish Arora et al., Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate Strat-
egy, 10 Indus. & Corp. Change 419, 424 n.5 (2001).
102. Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
829 (2014).
103. See id., at 860–61 (discussing various licensing challenges facing the book and music
industries).
104. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform 25
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1175, 1185–86.
105. Id. at 1198–203.
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patent rights are sought by owners in order to pave their own market exclu-
sivity, even though for nonpracticing entities such as universities, govern-
ments, and specialized inventors, licenses can hasten inventions to the
market in the first place.106 The doctrine of willfulness, which trebles dam-
ages for knowing infringements of patents, also discourages parties from
talking to each other, lest a failed licensing negotiation become the basis for
a claim for enhanced damages.107 The question of how to encourage technol-
ogy transactions deserves further deliberation. For example, limiting the
chill that the willfulness doctrine places on negotiations, enabling patent
holders to signal a desire and willingness to license, making licensing data
more available, or requiring patent holders to record changes to ownership
are all policy options worth further deliberation.108
3. Making It Easier to Differentiate Between Works Held for
Exclusion and Inclusion
Given the tremendous variation in the ways that intellectual property is
used, it would also be worth exploring making it easier for creators to signal
to the public their intents with respect to their works. As Silbey’s subjects
attest, patents are often filed in pursuit of nonexclusionary ends such as
signaling value to investors or for defensive purposes.109 Twitter and Tesla
found clarifying that their company’s patents are filed to be used “as a shield
rather than as a weapon”110 and in support of, rather than against, an “open
source philosophy”111 important enough that both companies publicly did
it. When Google decided to bid for Nortel’s patent portfolio, it explained on
its corporate blog that the move was intended to help, not undermine, the
open-source community and that its acquisition was defensive, a move to
“create a disincentive for others to sue Google.”112 To ensure that such cor-
porate representations are backed up with reliable forbearance, companies
could elect into a “defensive only” patent option as described above.
Creative Commons provides one way for copyright holders to reserve
some, rather than all, copyright rights in works. But its reach is far from
106. Ashish Arora et al., The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in American
Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20264, 2014).
107. See Chien, supra note 22 (manuscript at 12).
108. See Remarks by Director Michelle K. Lee at The Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) Patent Reform Forum, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (July 6, 2015, 12:48
PM), http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-michelle-k-lee-center-
strategic-and-international-studies [http://perma.cc/VK86-NEKD] (describing how patent re-
form can provide “increased transparency of patent ownership information to reduce the bar-
riers to patent licensing and sales”).
109. See pp. 113–14, 209–10.
110. Messinger, supra note 66.
111. Musk, supra note 66.
112. Kent Walker, Patents and Innovation, Google Blog (Apr. 4, 2011), https://google
blog.blogspot.com/2011/04/patents-and-innovation.html [https://perma.cc/QT7K-ZFG8].
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comprehensive, and the desire for easier ways to clarify the status of works
persists.113 As described earlier, many, if not most, copyrighted works are
created without the expectation of remuneration, and in many cases the cre-
ators would benefit from greater circulation of the work. One example of
how this intuition is enshrined in copyright law is the prohibition on copy-
right over U.S. government works made by federal employees,114 a policy
originally motivated by the desire to ensure democratic engagement with
political speeches and laws.115 But because the U.S. government routinely
releases works that are created by government contractors, which are pro-
tectable by copyright, there can be ambiguity about the status of the work
that results and whether or not it can be reused.116
The orphan-works problem most clearly demonstrates how legal uncer-
tainties suppress the circulation of works. Implementing orphan-works re-
forms by limiting the remedies available to reappearing rights holders,
extending fair use, and supporting collective licensing regimes,117 should be
among the highest priorities for Congress as it takes up copyright reform.
Others have suggested statutory mechanisms for allowing users to choose to
allow all noncommercial or humanitarian uses of their works.118 Already, the
fair-use defense to copyright infringement is quicker to excuse infringement
when the use is noncommercial,119 and this legal status reflects the docu-
mented instinct of members of the public that educational or humanitarian
reuses are permissible.120 The problem in these cases may be more technical
than legal in nature. While authors may be willing to share with certain
audiences—for example K–12 children in neighborhoods in need121—ensur-
ing that free uses are not diverted to displace paid uses is a major concern.
Another aspect of copyright reform, therefore, should be investments in
technologies that reduce the risks associated with sharing.
113. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 65, at 1182–91 (critiquing Creative Commons as ill-
fitted to certain types of works, incompatible with certain kinds of uses, and failing both to
leverage intrinsic motivations and to capture the range of possible sharing behaviors).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
115. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-927, at n.28 (1990) (stating that § 105 was enacted “to
keep government data as free as possible of potential restrictions on dissemination”).
116. See Joshua Tauberer et al., Open Government Data: Best-Practices Language for Mak-
ing Data “License Free”, @unitedstates (Dec. 12, 2013), https://theunitedstates.io/licensing/
#for-government-works-producted-by-a-contractor [https://perma.cc/2WSM-QVSX] (arguing
that data becomes “more valuable when it is clear that there is a green light enabling reuse”).
117. For a discussion of orphan-works reforms, see Hansen et al., supra note 87, at 23–48.
118. See Goss, supra note 95, at 990–96.
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
120. See Mandel et al., supra note 62, at 30–31.
121. See First Book Partners with White House, Libraries and Publishers on Groundbreaking
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Another approach to sorting between those using intellectual property
for exclusion versus inclusion is to require that rights holders opt into exclu-
sion rather than out of it. The easiest way to do this is to make sure that the
author or inventor actually wants the intellectual property. In fact, they usu-
ally don’t. Only one out of five U.S. companies doing research-and-develop-
ment files for any patents,122 and historical surveys show, for example, that
only 21 percent of library works in 1908, and a third of posters from 1976,
were copyrighted.123
4. Reforming Patent Marking and Copyright Registration
Patent law continues to require inventors to affirmatively apply for the
grant of a patent and to make payments to keep patents in force.124 Copy-
rights under U.S. law, on the other hand, now vest automatically in the
author, conferring the right to exclude regardless of whether the holder ac-
tually wants to do so.125 Both intellectual property regimes, however, incor-
porate the idea that those who seek to enforce their rights must take
affirmative steps. To get statutory damages or to recover attorney’s fees in
copyright, an owner must register the work.126 And to get damages for in-
fringement, patent holders must provide notice to the infringer, which can
be accomplished by marking products that embody the intellectual prop-
erty.127 In theory then, members of the public should have notice of which
rights intellectual property holders seek to enforce. More could be done,
however, to make these public notice mechanisms meaningful. In the case of
patent damages, the marking requirement is riddled with loopholes.128 It
does not extend to process patents or nonpracticed patents. If those loop-
holes were closed, marking could provide a more useful filter.129 In addition,
122. Brandon Shackelford, Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. and Eng’g Statistics, NSF 13-307,
One in Five U.S. Businesses with R&D Applied for a U.S. Patent in 2008 1 (2013),
www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13307/nsf13307.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HNY-R7Q7].
123. Sprigman, supra note 25, at 512–14.
124. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2015) (proscribing the maintenance fees that patentees must
pay to keep their patents in force).
125. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/
Hate Relationship, 33 Colum. J.L. & Arts 311 (2010).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2012); cf. Dennis Crouch, False Marking: Lobbying Against the
Senate Bill, Patently-O (Mar. 21, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/false-marking-
lobbying-against-the-senate-bill.html [http://perma.cc/PAN7-JUBX] (describing penalties for
the false marking of products).
128. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in
Patent Law, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 799, 808, 834 (2002) (calling the marking statute “inco-
herent” and “problematic” including because it “allows knowledgeable (even willful) infringers
to remain immune from damages liability . . . .”); Chien, supra note 22 (manuscript at 54–55);
Christina Sharkey, Strategic Assertions: Evading the Patent Marking Requirement, 12 Nw. J.
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 103 (2014) (calling for closing the patent-marking loophole for process
patents).
129. Blair & Cotter, supra note 128, at 843–45 (suggesting reforms to the current patent-
marking requirement that would provide better notice to potential infringers).
April 2016] Beyond Eureka 1105
if inducements to register and keep patent ownership information up-to-
date were enhanced, more people would register ownership and transfers,
which would facilitate licensing and signal an author’s exclusionary mo-
tive.130 The availability of certain remedies could be contingent upon regis-
tration to induce those with an exclusionary motive to register. The concept
of pre-enforcement notice has long been embedded in U.S. law and enables
the public to assess the risks associated with the use of intellectual property.
B. Supporting Attribution
Finally, one way that U.S. law could be shaped to better support creative
interests is by recognizing the importance of attributional and reputational
interests. Encouragingly, in congressional hearings, “the issues of individual
authors, including attribution and the ability to say no to specific uses” have
been discussed recently.131 Moral rights—including the rights of attribution
and the right of integrity—are absent under U.S. law except in the case of
works of visual art that fall within the ambit of the Visual Artists Rights Act
(VARA).132
Patent law at least requires that the accurate inventors of a product be
memorialized on the face of the patent.133 Inventors can also get credit when
their patents and publications are subsequently cited by others, generating a
“forward citation.”134 These forms of credit-giving are limited, however. The
relationship between patents and products in the market is tenuous at best,
and there is no requirement that inventors be notified when an invention is
commercialized. Forward citations are not trackable in a systematic way, and
there is doubt about what they measure.135 Copyright law’s support for attri-
bution is even more meager. There is no comparable requirement to associ-
ate an author with a work,136 although, removing copyright information
including authorship information from a work is a punishable offense.137
130. Samuelson, supra note 104, at 1199–201.
131. The Register’s Perspective on Copyright Review: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28 (Apr. 29, 2015) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, U.S. Register of
Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office).
132. E.g., Lastowka, supra note 58, at 69.
133. E.g., Fromer, supra note 12, at 1790–98 (2012) (contrasting these and other ways in
which patent law is more supportive of attribution rights than copyright law).
134. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation:
A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. Econ. 129, 134 (2001) (“An inventor must cite all
related prior U.S. patents in the patent application.”).
135. See, e.g., David S. Abrams et al., Patent Value and Citations 22 (2013), http://
www.oecd.org/site/stipatents/psdm2013_2_1_abrams.pdf [http://perma.cc/HE9Z-TAPD] (il-
lustrating the unclear correlation between forward citations and patent value above a certain
patent value threshold).
136. Fromer, supra note 12, at 1793.
137. See 17 U.S.C. 1202 (b) (penalizing the removal of author information from a copy-
righted work).
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While copyright registrations also list a work’s authors, registration is no
longer required under U.S. copyright law.138
As described earlier, trademark interests are arguably most closely al-
igned with the attributional interests of creators. A series of court decisions,
culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2003 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. decision, however, significantly limited the possibility of us-
ing intellectual property law to protect attribution, as distinct from eco-
nomic, interests.139
In this void, there exist a few ways of enhancing attributional interests
within copyright law. First, the Copyright Office could catalog and en-
courage best practices for giving attribution. Whether in a work itself
through credits or in author pages or liner notes, best practices of attribu-
tion could be cataloged.140 Although Creative Commons provides guidance
on how to attribute to its adopters, it appears that its attribution provisions
are consistently violated. According to an analysis of over 227 million Crea-
tive Commons photos, more than 90 percent were not attributed and 99
percent were not attributed correctly.141 Although this is just one data point,
greater attention to attribution practices is needed given how important re-
ceiving credit is to creators. The Copyright Office could explore permitting
the registration of attribution interests and attribution specifications sepa-
rate and apart from copyright interests, pursuant to its authority under 17
U.S.C. § 205, for example.142 Permitting such registrations would legitimize
attribution interests and increase the chance that a court would find the
creator’s reliance on the attribution actionable. Like a registry of patent
pledges, a registry of Creative Commons–type licenses can boost the li-
censes’ reliability at a low cost to the government.
Another approach, proposed by the Copyright Office in 2006, would be
to reward third-party attribution in cases of orphan works.143 The proposal
limits damages in situations where the infringer has, in good faith, carried
out a reasonably diligent but unsuccessful search to locate the owner of the
infringed copyright, and “throughout the course of the infringement, pro-
vided attribution to the author and copyright owner of the work, if possible
and as appropriate under the circumstances . . . .”144 Silbey’s work validates
the merits of such an approach. Finally, another proposal would be to re-
ward attribution by making it a “fifth” fair-use factor in determining
138. Fromer, supra note 12, at 1793–94.
139. See p. 166 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2003)).
140. See Fromer, supra note 12, at 1792.
141. How To Attribute Creative Commons Photos, Foter Blog (Mar. 4, 2015), http://
foter.com/blog/how-to-attribute-creative-commons-photos/ [http://perma.cc/9RYN-Q3F9].
142. “Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may
be recorded in the Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2012).
143. U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works (2006), http://www.copyright.
gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/SQN6-AG8N].
144. Id. at 127.
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whether or not the use of a copyrighted work is defensible.145 According to
the proposal, if an infringer gives credit to the author, the infringer’s use is
more likely to be considered fair.146 Courts have at times taken into account
attribution in applying the existing four fair-use factors, but codifying this
practice would create a much stronger incentive for users to attribute to
original authors.147
Conclusion
At the time of this writing, lawmakers are grappling with how to reform
copyright and patent law. High on the agenda are urgent objectives like deal-
ing with abusive patent litigation,148 limiting the harm to small firms from
poorly worded demand letters,149 and recalibrating statutory damages for
copyright infringement.150 But while lawmakers consider these important
policy problems, they should also consider the day-to-day lives of creators
and how policymaking could benefit creators. Silbey’s Eureka Myth provides
a glimpse into what is important to creators and into the role of intellectual
property in creative pursuits. In reading it, the desire for freedom above all is
clear. As a result, unlike some of the most controversial copyright and patent
reforms being considered, the options described above largely do not en-
shrine rigid rules that favor one constituency over another. Instead, they
create options for those who may not be best served all the time by intellec-
tual property’s default rules. For those for whom copyright and patent law
are working fine, the world need not look different. But rewarding and mak-
ing it easier for rights holders to signal their exclusive and inclusive intents,
to share through paid and unpaid licenses, and for others to credit them
through attribution would support others as their needs and desires change,
well beyond the moment of Eureka.
145. Lastowka, supra note 58, at 84–89.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 85–89.
148. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, House Judiciary
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